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1 Introduction
The reasoning in this paper rests on the following four principles: i) Actions
are based on models. Models are abstract representations of a real world.
They express what we know or think to know about the world. ii) Actions are
taken today, their consequences are experienced in the future. The future
world is partly “men made” and partly determined by “nature”. That is,
the reality realized in the future results on the one side from exogenous
factors, which may be called luck or fate. On the other side, they are an
endogenous outcome of past or present day human actions. iii) Within a
given model, we can form expectations about the consequences and choose
actions such that they fit our goals. But we also know that expectations will
be deceived if they are based on inaccurate models. iv) Uncertainty arises
from limited knowledge. Knowledge can be limited in the sense that we do
not know precisely, or that “we simply do not know” as Keynes (1937, p.
214) has put it. Several proposals have been made to formalize imperfection
of knowledge – from Shackle’s (1949) contributions to Fuzzy logic. I will use
the probabilistic language for talking about things that are known more or
less precisely, yet not for sure. In this language probability measures are
assigned to possible realizations of events. We speak of risk if there is precise
knowledge about the probability distribution of the uncertain states. Having
knowledge about a set of distributions rather than a specific distribution,
is usually addressed as Knightian uncertainty – after Knight (1921). This
paper points to a more fundamental point. Probability measures can only be
assigned to distinguishable events. So the question is, what is the appropriate
state space on which measures are formed and actions are conditioned.
The purpose of the paper is first to ask: What is a rational, that is, a logically
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consistent way of accounting for the knowledge that actions are based on
models and models are based on limited knowledge about the world? Second,
which practical guidelines can be drawn for dealing with uncertainty? For
answering these questions, I outline a general formal framework as well as a
more specific model of standard economic decision making under uncertainty.
The specific model is then applied to an economy with financial markets.
The most salient example of the successful career of standard economic risk
analysis and its tragedy was the sophistication of finance and the financial
crisis. A huge set of new financial instruments has been developed over the
last decades – with the claim to generate high returns and reduce risk at the
same time. Ideally, financial innovations increase market completeness by
expanding the set of states that is spanned by independent financial instru-
ments (Magill and Quinzii, 1996). At the macroeconomic level, a richer set of
state-dependent financial instruments allows to finance new specialized tech-
nologies which are risky but highly productive and thus foster development
(Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997). Now, if the number of financial products
traded in the financial market increases by a factor of ten or more (Studer,
2015), one may worry about whether they help indeed to deal better with
economic uncertainty or they rather increase the risks to which an economy
is exposed. If one asks which products have problematic features or are de-
signed in a sloppy way, then one gets essentially two answers: First, it is the
system, not the single product. Second, the products don’t account properly
for the correlation with all the other products. But why does the unreliable
system with a rich set of sophisticated products emerge and expand? A pos-
sible answer is that many people are naive and the clever ones are “phishing
for fools” (Akerlof and Shiller, 2015). I think we should add to these answers
a further one: The increased sophistication in dealing with uncertainty in the
3
financial market is based on a false pretense of knowledge – not only in the
financial industry but in the scientific community as well.1 The framework
presented in this paper allows to discuss this pretense of knowledge in a
rigorous way and to derive a rule for sound financial innovation.
The paper is organized in the following way. The next section discusses the
general logic of modelling model-based action and presents a specific uncer-
tainty structure. Section 3 introduces the concepts granularity and coverage
as key characteristics for ordering the uncertainty structure presented in Sec-
tion 2. Section 4 analyzes the choice of an appropriate model in terms of the
two characteristics. Section 5 addresses the dialogue between experts and
decision makers, Section 6 concludes.
2 Modelling model based action with limited
knowledge
What is a logically consistent way of accounting for the knowledge that
choices are based on models and models are based on limited knowledge
about the world? To address this question, I formalize first the problem in a
general way and then in a more specific model using probabilistic language.
1Caballero (2010) prominently pointed to “the pretense-of-knowledge syndrome” in
economics and emphasized that the lesson to be drawn from the financial crisis was to
give up the pretension.
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2.1 General framework
As the formulation of the question makes clear, an answer requires to tran-
scend somehow the economic analysis in the narrow sense, looking at it from
outside in a language that addresses economic models as objects.2 At the
level of standard economic analysis, the most basic primitives of the language
are a choice x in a model M . Model M expresses in an abstract way our
knowledge about relevant features of world W .3 Choice x is a men-made
object, chosen on the basis of M , the consequences of which are experienced
in the real world. They depend on the performance of x inW . The valuation
of the consequences is a normative issue and usually a subjective thing. Let
V (x,W )
denote the value of x in W .
Rational choice of x in M usually means to maximize the value of the conse-
2At first glance the two layers – choice between models and choice within model – may
bring to ones mind the discussion about choosing an opportunity set from a collection of
such sets in the literature on flexibility or freedom. For instance, Puppe and Xu (2010)
argue, based on Puppe (1996), a desirable choice set should be rich in terms of essential al-
ternatives included in the set. Under uncertainty, however, there is an additional problem:
Freedom of choice between unreliable alternatives is not necessarily a good thing.
3Paul Romer’s (Romer, 2015) criticism of “matheness” calls into mind that economic
modelling requires to tie the abstract and formal components of a model to the real world
to be modeled. Pfleiderer (2014) speaks of Chameleons who within M pretend to talk
about W and, if confronted with W , come up with the excuse that M is just a toy model.
Hellwig (2015) points out that, in particular in the application of economics to policy
questions, our discipline lacks a good practice for selecting an appropriate model for a
given context. I share the view that disciplining our modeling by careful checking that M
captures essential features of W in an appropriate way is the most important requirement
for scientific analysis.
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quences of x according to the knowledge about W as captured by the model
M . That leads to
V (x∗[M ],W ), x∗[M ] ≡ argmax
x
V (x,M).
An omniscient decision maker would have an ideal model M∞ that cap-
tures all relevant features of W correctly so that the value of the model
consequences of the optimal choice coincides with the value of its real world
consequences:
V (x∗[M∞],M∞) = V (x
∗[M∞],W ) .
Actually, however, V (x∗[M ],W ) may fall short of V (x∗[M ],M) for any feasi-
ble model M , due to limited knowledge. Let ∆(M,W ) denote the deception
arising from the deviation of the actual outcome of x∗[M ] from the outcome
promised by the model M . Then
q(M) ≡ 1−
∆(M,W )
V (x∗[M ],M)
≤ 1
assigns to models a quality attribute. q(M) expresses how appropriate or
reliable model M is for guiding economic decision. Of course we cannot de-
termine the quality ofM withM . Ideally, we would wish to experiment with
different models from a set of potential models M ≡ {M is model for W}
and collect for each M ∈ M deceptions and surprises from comparing the
model values of the respective optimal choices with the experienced values.
While the approach “let the data” speak works well if a narrow set of hy-
potheses or statistical models is considered, the idea to verify or falsify the-
ories in this way is more questionable. We rather have to look for model
characteristics that might arguably be used to form reasonable priors about
q(M). Formally, this means to define a structure on M that allows to com-
pare models in M according to some order which can then be related to
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model reliability.4 At the general level, no specific ordering is possible; only
a way to approach the problem can be sketched. For guiding our ordering of
models about the world, one can try to assign to models the pieces of infor-
mation they require for finding an optimal choice. This gives us for M ∈M,
a list Kd(M), which expresses the knowledge requirements of a model. We
may call Kd the demand of knowledge.5 On the supply side, we have a data
generating process which reveals information about the world. This gives
us at time t some pool of knowledge Ks(t); we could call it the supply of
knowledge. Now, the central idea of the presented paper is that, if a deci-
sion is to be made, at a given time t, we should be aware that the quality
of a model declines if its demand of knowledge is high. Rational dealing
with uncertainty therefore requires not only behaving optimally within some
framework but also to choose a framework that is in line with the knowledge
we have at hand.6 For being more specific, we need more structure and have
to fix ideas about the real world context we are dealing with.
4 There are similar problems in other areas, for instance, the complexity of a program
in a formal language. One can execute a program and measure the computing time,
provided the program stops in the time span available. Or you can try to look for a
suitable complexity measure on the set of programs. Nested Do loops or If then clauses
may be indicators of computational complexity, for example.
5 To give an example, which I do not address in this paper: For answering economic
questions in an expected utility framework one usually needs, apart from knowledge of the
probability distribution, information on the risk aversion and how it changes with income.
This involves information about the third derivatives of the utility function. One may
therefore ask if utility functions are an appropriate language to express risk attitudes.
6 Keeping things open until more knowledge is there, as suggested by the notion of
flexibility, is possible sometimes, but in general decisions cannot wait until all required
knowledge is available. More fundamentally, options don’t create reality.
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2.2 Specific uncertainty structure
Uncertainty in economics is generated by “nature” but also by the model
we use to “produce the future”. As the example of financial innovations
outlined in the introduction illustrates, the production of the future includes
both the design of instruments (technologies, financial products) and the al-
location of resources on the instruments. In other words, the problem of
rational dealing with uncertainty from a system’s point of view is not only
how to play given lotteries but also how to design the “lotteries” so that
the future economic development is good according to some (subjective or
social) value standards.7 Hence, rational dealing with uncertainty involves
two steps: First, choosing an appropriate frame for guiding the design of
instruments for investing into the future and, second, making right decisions
conditional on the chosen frame. My contribution focuses on the first step,
assuming that the second step follows standard procedures. The presented
general framework suggests to order models according to the knowledge re-
quirements they imply.8 In the standard economic model of decision making
7 This fact may be the main source of misunderstandings in the communication with
standard decision theory or “behavioristic” representations of the problem of uncertainty.
In a world with innovation the consistent derivation of “number(s) used in calculating the
expectation (integral) of a random variable” (Schmeidler (1989, p. 573)) is a necessary re-
quirement but not sufficient for dealing with economic uncertainty – regardless of whether
the numbers are objective or subjective probabilities. We play the lotteries that we have
designed, or more precisely: Some agents, for instance the households, play the “lotteries”
with technical or financial engineers design.
8 One may wonder what precisely is the meaning of knowledge requirements. My
understanding of knowledge is pragmatic: What do I need to know for solving a problem?
For instance, for designing contingent financial products I have to identify the events
upon which their pay offs are contingent, and for pricing the products I must know the
probability distribution of the events. If I want to choose a portfolio, I need to know
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under uncertainty the core model components are state space and probability
distribution on the space. Therefore, we need a formal structure that allows
to order state spaces according to characteristics which are related to the
knowledge required for a correct assessment of the probability distribution
on the space that is relevant for the decision to be made. Well, the most
fundamental requirement for assigning probability measures to states is that
the states are distinguishable from each other. As Diamond (1967) pointed
out in the context of technological uncertainty and financial markets, the ul-
timate limit of market completion is “an inability to distinguish finely among
the states of nature in the economy’s trading” (p. 760).
Let us suppose that the ideal model M∞ of the exogenous part of the future
is a probability space (Ω,A, pi) where A is a σ-field in state space Ω and pi
a probability measure on A. The space represents the “nature” of potential
future events in full detail and comprises an accurate measure pi for all the
events.
The “men-made” part of the future results from the allocation of an economic
resource K, for example capital, on a set N of instruments – technologies
and financial products. To focus on the role of uncertainty we assume that
my endowment, my risk attitude, the set of feasible instruments, their state-contingent
performance and the probabilities of the realization of states, where endowment and risk
attitude are known givens in this paper. The fact that I can apply my own subjective
probabilities does not change the fact that I need to know them for solving the addressed
problem. More formally, in the language of theoretical computer science, problem solving
requires to put input into a problem solver. Whoever uses the problem solver has to let the
problem solver know the required input. Whether the user of the problem solver comes to
the input by forming subjective beliefs or by evaluating data, the complexity of the user’s
task rises with the complexity of the required input; in the context discussed here, with
the sophistication of the state space.
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the provision of instruments is costless. To fix ideas, let us think of a set
of financial products offered by the financial market. Each product has a
real investment project as underlying.9 The performance of projects can be
more or less sensitive to exogenous conditions. Thus, a financial product is
a contingent pay-off promise. Formally, project ν ∈ N is characterized by
the return Rν and an event Aν ∈ A on which it is contingent. An agent who
invests one unit of capital in project ν today (t = 0) is promised to receive
Rν(ω) =


RAν if ω ∈ Aν
0 otherwise
(1)
tomorrow (t = 1) . We say project i is specialized or targeted to Aν . The
larger Aν , the more robust is the project.
Apart from the risky projects there is also a robust one, financed by a bond
paying off a constant return
r(ω) = r (2)
for all ω ∈ Ω.
Standard portfolio theory tells us that it would be desirable to have contin-
gent instruments for all states, to exploit diversification advantages fully and
eliminate risk. Yet, for creating contingent investment opportunities for all
events in a reliable way, we would need very detailed knowledge. In reality,
we don’t have full knowledge. In particular, not all states of Ω may be distin-
guishable from each other so that the measurement of events and the design
of instruments targeted to different events are limited. So which probabil-
9 The following model uses a simplified variant of Falkinger (2014), where the rela-
tionship between technologies and financial products is analyzed in a general equilibrium
model with technological uncertainty, financial markets and imperfect information.
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ity space should be used for creating specialized instruments and allocating
capital to the instruments?
As a metaphor, we can think of the future as a partially unknown land for
which we have to draw a map to guide tours to specific targets.10 On the
one side, one would like to have a map with a fine grid that covers the entire
terrain. On the other side, the information for filling the fine grid with correct
details may be missing so that a more coarse or incomplete map gives better
guidance. The metaphor suggests that two characteristics are important
for a good map: First, that the coverage of the map shows the boundary
of the terrain for which more or less details are known. If any terrain lies
outside this boundary, one knows that there no details can be distinguished
at all. Second, that in the covered part of the map the granularity of the
grid is in line with the details that can be reliably distinguished. Formally,
the fact of limited distinguishability of future events can be modeled in the
following way: Denote by S ⊂ Ω the more or less explored terrain, whereas
S¯ ≡ Ω − S is unexplored. Let, for an index set N = {1, ..., n}, Θ := {Aν ∈
A and pi(Aν) > 0}ν∈N be a decomposition of S ⊂ Ω (that is: Aν and A
′
ν
are disjoint if ν 6= ν ′ and
⋃
ν∈N Aν = S). I call nΘ the granularity of Θ
and µΘ = pi(S) the coverage of Θ. In a Θ-constrained economy, besides the
robust project, n risky projects contingent on Aν , ν ∈ N , are available.
Definition 1. An economy is Θ-constrained if the class of distinguishable
10 As Hirshleifer (1971) emphasized, “discovery” is to be distinguished from “foreknowl-
edge”. A map expresses the “foreknowledge” we have accumulated from past experience.
Agents who plan explorative adventurous tours are aware that they may discover things
on which the map is silent. What would be more awkward is, if the map shows unreliable
details and an engineer plans a rail track based on those details; plus the financial market
offers financing instruments with pay off promises sensitive to these details.
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events is Θ ∪ {S¯} and the set of targeted instruments consists of nΘ A-
contingent projects with pay offs RA, A ∈ Θ.
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In a Θ-constrained economy, agents consider the events A ∈ Θ ⊂ A rather
than ω ∈ Ω as relevant states and they can choose a portfolio {xΘ(A)}A∈Θ
of state-contingent investments. For the (possibly empty) unknown terrain
S no targeted instruments exist so that only a globally robust instrument,
with return r, can be used to prepare for events there. Let xΘ(Ω) denote
the capital allocated to this instrument. For allocating total resource K
on a portfolio xΘ = {xΘ(A1), ..., xΘ(An), xΘ(Ω)} in a reasonable way, the
part of measure pi one needs to know is piΘ = {pi(A)}A∈Θ. Actually, agents
may not know the measure correctly. Following the seminal contributions of
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Bewley (2002) on Knightian uncertainty,
limited knowledge about pi can be modeled by assuming that agents know
only the set of measures to which the true measure belongs:
Π(Θ), piΘ ∈ Π(Θ).
Apart from uncertainty about piΘ, coverage µΘ may be uncertain, too. Yet
the information basis about the boundary between territory S, known at scale
Θ, and the unknown terrain S¯ is of a different nature than the knowledge
within S. Either one has information on the size of the whole world Ω or one
has not. In the first case, we know µΘ for sure; in the second case, we have
11 Since each ν addresses exactly one event A we can skip index ν. Here instruments are
fully specialized to a particular event. A looser form would be that instruments work best
in the targeted conditions but to some extent also perform in other conditions. In this case,
the correlation between instruments could be used as a measure of (non-)distinguishability.
See Studer (2015) for an equilibrium analysis of financial innovations based on correlated
underlying projects.
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to choose a weight that expresses our subjective view on the importance of
the unknown terrain relative to the terrain which we know at least to some
extent.12 In both cases µΘ is exogenous – as an observed measure in the first
case or as a belief in the second case. We have the restricition
µΘ =
∑
A∈Θ
pi(A) (3)
on ΠΘ.
Projects with high and robust outcomes clearly dominate projects which work
only under rare conditions and even then show poor performance. A non-
trivial economic problem arises if high returns can only be achieved at the
cost of robustness. We can capture such trade-offs by assuming that feasible
projects are bounded by an efficiency frontier that satisfies the following
property:
Assumption 1. There exists R > 0 so that for any A ∈ Θ with 0 < pi(A) < 1
12 If one thinks it is unreasonable to put a positive weight on something we do not know
(though we know there may be something) the appropriate weight is µΘ = 1. To require
from the user of a model to take a stand on 1− µΘ ∈ [0, 1) mirrors the conviction that it
is reasonable to be aware that there may be regions of events outside the familiar terrain.
In Schmeidler’s (1989) subjective probability approach, if I understand him correctly,
the instruments would be defined with respect to a partition Θ′ of Ω rather than of
S ⊂ Ω: and if we are not sure about the objective piΘ′ we would determine the quantities
invested in the alternatives A ∈ Θ′ by evaluating the expected consequences, using a
set of numbers {v(A)|A ∈ Θ′} with
∑
A∈Θ′ v(A) < 1 and v(Ω) = 1. The non-additive
subjective probability v reflects that we are not sure about pi′Θ or that something apart
from A ∈ Θ′ may happen. But why then design lotteries for Θ′ rather than ask: What can
be distinguished in a way that additive probabilities can be assigned more or less reliably
and what is the part about which we have no specific knowledge to distinguish events?
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the return of the efficient A-specialized project is inversely related to pi(A):
RA =
µR
pi(A)
. (4)
Moreover µR > r. Otherwise no risk avers agent would invest into risky
projects.
R expresses the average productivity level of the risky projects in which
agents can invest by using the financial products offered by the financial
market.13
3 Model ordering and reliability of action
The approach of this paper is guided by the following idea. We look at
the world with a frame of mind. The frame may be structured in a more
13 The assessment of R involves two types of agents. On the one side, R is the average
pay-off promised by the financial market for holding risky assets. It reflects the finan-
cial agents’ beliefs about the average productivity of the underlying risky projects. The
underlying projects, on the other hand, are specialized technologies which work highly
productive under the conditions to which they are targeted but don’t perform outside
the conditions. Thus, R represents the stock of general technological knowledge, from
which engineers and entrepreneurs can draw know-how for creating technologies which
are targeted to performance in clearly specified conditions. Picking up insights of the
endogenous growth literature, one may argue that due to spillover effects R increases with
the “ richness” of set N of instruments. This paper assumes that the financial market
holds correct beliefs about the productivity of the underlying technologies so that pay-off
promise and productivity coincide and both can be represented by the same symbol, R.
Actually, beliefs about average pay-offs may be biased by what Keynes called the “state of
expectation” so that the financial market may distort investment decisions by spreading
optimistic or pessimistc signals. Such distortions are not considered in this paper.
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or less sophisticated way, where the degree of sophistication is a choice we
make. More specifically, we shape the future by investing in instruments the
performance of which is contingent on specific conditions. We assume that
for a quasi-omniscient agent the probability space (Ω,A, pi) is the best frame
for guiding the use of such instruments. Under limited knowledge about the
measure pi on A, a cruder frame Θ ⊂ A, in which possible future events are
distinguished in a less differentiated way, may be a more reliable guide for
targeting instruments and allocating resources on the instruments. The goal
of this section is to establish an order on the set of possible state spaces Θ
and to give guidance on the choice of a space, in a way such that deceptions
arising from actions conditioned on the states in the chosen space are kept
within tolerable bounds. In the following I propose an ordering according to
granularity and coverage.
3.1 Granularity and coverage
In a Θ-constrained economy, the possibilities to prepare for the uncertain
future by contingent actions are limited by the granularity, nΘ, and the
coverage, µΘ, of distinguished events. Since targeted actions are more pro-
ductive than a robust one, in an ideal world, a finely differentiated grid Θ
covering many events is preferable to coarse granularity and low coverage.
The following definition characterizes decompositions of Ω along this line of
reasoning.
Definition 2. Let for S, S ′ ⊂ Ω, Θ, Θ′ ⊂ A be decompositions of S and
S ′, respectively. i) Θ′ is a refinement of Θ if and only if for all A′ ∈ Θ′
there exists A ∈ Θ so that A′ ⊂ A. ii) Θ′ is an extension of Θ if
⋃
A∈ΘA ⊂⋃
A′∈Θ′ A
′.
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By definition, for any strict refinement: n′Θ > nΘ, and for a strict extension:
µ′Θ > µΘ. Thus, restricting the discussion to decompositions which can
be ordered as refinements and extensions of other decompositions, we can
order state spaces by nΘ and µΘ and express the value generated by optimal
behavior in a model based on Θ as function of granularity and coverage:
V (nΘ, µΘ). (5)
Advantages of a more differentiated or extended grid for targeting actions
imply that V is weakly increasing in both arguments.
Yet, finer granularity and higher coverage imply increasing knowledge re-
quirements. More events have to be distinguished and measured. For agents
whose knowledge is limited, this usually implies to base actions on unreliable
beliefs and to experience deception by unintended consequences of actions
in the future. Thus, differentiation advantages have to be weighed against
costs of unreliability. Before turning to this, I want to illustrate (5) in more
detail.
Suppose that risk preferences of investors are such that an amount K1 of
total capital is invested in risky but highly productive projects and the rest
K0 = K −K1
is invested in the safe project with low pay-off r.
Under Θ, K1 can be diversified in a portfolio (xΘ(A))A∈Θ, where investment
xΘ(A) promises to generate income stream
yA =


RAxΘ(A) if ω ∈ A
0 otherwise.
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Since RA =
µR
pi(A)
, according to (4), the income stream (yA)A∈Θ can be fully
smoothed by choosing xΘ(A) proportionally to pi(A). Any risk avers investor
will therefore choose the portfolio
xΘ(A) =
pi(A)
µ
K1, A ∈ Θ. (6)
(Note that
∑
A∈Θ pi(A) adds up to µ. Subscript Θ in piΘ and µΘ is omitted
if the restriction of pi to Θ is obvious from the context.)
This portfolio promises for all ω ∈ S the income
Y p[K1] = RK1, (7)
where R may be increasing in n if there are technological spillovers from
innovation.14 Since K0 generates income rK0 in S as well as in S¯, the income
stream generated by K0, K1 is given by
Y =


RK1 + rK0 in S
rK0 in S¯.
(8)
The optimal split of K into risky investment K1 and robust investment K0
depends on the specific risk preferences. An expected utility maximizer will
solve
max
K0,K1
EU = µU(RK1 + rK0) + (1− µ)U(rK0)
s.t. K0 +K1 = K.
14Following Ethier (1982) and Romer (1987) the productivity of a resource spent on a
variety of specialized technologies can be modeled by a CES index
R =
[∑
A∈Θ
x(A)
1
σ
]σ
, σ > 1.
If events in Θ are symmetric, we have pi(A) = µ
n
and x(A) = K1
n
so that R = nσ−1K1,
which increases in n.
17
Using the envelope theorem, we conclude that ∂EU
∂R
> 0 and ∂EU
∂µ
> 0 under
the optimal portfolio, which supports (5). For a positive impact of n on R,
and thus EU , technological specialization advantages have to be at work.
For an example, we solve the maximization program for logarithmic utility,
which gives us
K0 =
1− µ
1− ρ
K, K1 =
µ− ρ
1− ρ
K, ρ ≡
r
R
(9)
for the optimal mix of robust and risky investment.15
Substituting this mix into (8), we obtain for the income promised from in-
vesting K optimally.16
Y p =


µRK ≡ Y p+ in S
r 1−µ
1−ρ
K ≡ Y p
−
in S¯.
(10)
3.2 Reliability of action
The allocation of K1 on risky projects
xΘ(A) =
pi(A)
µ
K1, A ∈ Θ
is based on a belief pi ∈ Π(Θ). If actually the true measure is pi∗ ∈ Π(Θ),
then the productivity of the A-contingent investment is µR
pi∗(A)
. Thus, the
actual income realised by xΘ(A) is a random stream
Y˜ [K1] =
(
RK1
pi(A)
pi∗(A)
)
A∈Θ
(11)
15 The first-order condition for maxµln (RK1 + r(K −K1) + (1− µ)) ln (r(K −K1))
is: 1−µ
µ(R−r) =
K−K1
RK1+r(K−K1)
which reduces to K1 =
µR−r
R−r
.
16 For Y p+ calculate R
µ−ρ
1−ρ + r
1−µ
1−ρ =
R
1−ρ(µ− ρ+ ρ− ρµ) = µR.
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rather than a safe value expected according to (7).
In other words, the promise to be fully insured within S, by using the nΘ
instruments feasible in the Θ-constrained economy, is deceived. The potential
extent of deception depends on the “size” of Π(Θ), since any pair piΘ, pi
∗
Θ ∈
Π(Θ) may be relevant for (11). In particular, for a given level of experience
from past realizations of events, a refinement Θ′ of Θ leaves more room
for uncertainty about the true probability measure. Thus, the potential
deception rises with nΘ. Moreover, the volatility of (11) increases if a larger
volume of income is generated by risky investment, that is, if more resources
K1 are invested in risky projects or if their average productivity R is high.
Now, as a larger µ raises the expected pay-off of risky projects, K1 tends to
rise with µ (as explicitly shown by (9) for the example of logarithmic utility).
In sum, it seems natural to assume that a reasonable measure of deception
is (weakly) increasing in granularity nΘ and coverage µΘ – given the level of
experience. Let
∆(nΘ, µΘ) (12)
be such a measure.
To be more specific, suppose for instance that beliefs deviate from the true
probability measure by some noise
pi(A) = pi∗(A) (1 + εΘ(A)) , (13)
where εΘ satisfies the following property.
Assumption 2. i) εΘ has zero mean. ii) Its variance is zero for nΘ ≤ n0
and an increasing function σ2(nΘ) of granularity afterwards, eventually going
to infinity.
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Part i) of the assumption excludes systematic errors. That is, both piΘ and
pi∗Θ add up to µΘ. Part ii) captures the idea that the experience from past
realizations of events suffices to assess pi∗Θ correctly as long as nΘ ≤ n0. Yet,
if contingent actions are targeted to more finely distinguished events, the
probability assessment of events becomes less reliable.17
With (11) the volatility of the income generated by risky investments is
VAR[K1] = (RK1)
2σ2(nΘ).
Using this as a measure of deception and applying the measure to portfolio
mix (9), optimal under logarithmic utility, we have
∆(nΘ, µΘ) =
(
µΘ − ρ
1− ρ
RK
)2
σ2(nΘ). (14)
4 Choosing an appropriate level of sophisti-
cation
In view of the differentiation advantages shown by (5), without limitations
of knowledge any increase in the granularity and coverage of targeted actions
would be a good thing. This reflects the common view among economists
that diversification and specialization are beneficial. Obviously, the benefits
must be weighed against the costs of innovation like development efforts
17 n0 corresponds to the maximal set Θ0 of events that can be accurately measured. Θ0
is not fixed forever but depends on the accumulated experience with the world we face.
Keynes (1921), p.28, said: “As the relevant evidence at our disposal increases, ... – we
have a more substantial basis upon which to rest our conclusion” so that the “weight of
an argument” increases. In the approach of this paper a more substantial experience basis
expands the space of events that we can accurately distinguish.
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for specialized projects or contingent financial products. For instance, in
Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) a fixed set up cost limits the range of financial
innovations, that is, the set of states covered by Arrow securities. Such
costs are set zero in this paper. Yet, if one accounts for the true nature of
uncertainty, there is an additional type of cost: The deception of plans by
reality.
As we have seen in the last section, decisions under uncertainty lead to de-
ceptions if they are based on an unreliable decomposition of future events
into distinguishable environments. This points to a fundamental difference
between decision making under risk and decision making under uncertainty.
In the former case, targeted actions are chosen in such a way that the net
benefit of the expected value of the chosen actions minus their cost is max-
imal. In addition to that, in the latter case, the reliability of the frame, on
which the choice of targeted actions is conditioned, has to be taken into ac-
count, too. Moreover, the frame is not exogenous but a men-made object.18
Therefore, we have to order frames according to their advantages and disad-
vantages. On the one side, raising granularity and coverage has gains from
diversification and specialization, as captured by V (nΘ, µΘ). On the other
side, starting from a known terrain, Θ0, any refinement or extension of the
18 For a given set Π(Θ) of imprecise measures, the literature on Knightian uncertainty
has proposed several approaches to choose the portfolio of actions xΘ more cautiously. For
instance, to maximize the outcome in the worst case or to apply more general concepts of
uncertainty aversion. Suppose, for instance, that µΘ = 1 and Π(Θ) is a parametrized fam-
ily (piΘ(p))p∈P of measures, where p is distributed over P according to a known measure
χ. Then the expected utility approach can be extended to the risk of the pi assessment
by choosing a portfolio xΘ that maximizes
∫
P
v[
∫
Θ
u(xθ(A))dpiΘ(A, p)]dχ(p), where v rep-
resents the attitude towards uncertainty. But the more fundamental aspect of economic
uncertainty is that Π(Θ) depends on the choice of Θ.
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set of distinguished future events tends to lower the reliability of plans tar-
geted to these events, as expressed by ∆(nΘ, µΘ). For an appropriate choice
of the frame we have to make up our mind about what is a tolerable level
of deceptions. At the level of society, deceptions of plans may concern many
people so that unreliable frames lead to some form of crisis, as the example
of financial product innovation has shown in a salient way.
Deliberations about what is a tolerable level of deceptions or crises are nor-
mative judgments so that there is no undisputable way of ordering frames. As
suggested by the quality attribute q assigned to models in the general frame-
work outlined in section 2.1, a criterion for appropriate choices of frames
should keep their potential deceptions in line with the gains they promise.
Formally, granularity nΘ and coverage µΘ should satisfy the inequality
∆(nΘ, µΘ) ≤ βV (nΘ, µΘ) (15)
where β > 0 is a parameter expressing the tolerance for deception.
For getting more specific conclusions, we apply the criterion to the case of
portfolio choice under logarithmic utility considered in section 3. Agents are
aware of the fact that future income will be low in S¯. There is no deception in
this, because they know that only a low productivity instrument is available
for preparing to this part of the future. The deception arises from risky
investment K1 in S, where a sure income outcome
Y p[K1] = RK1
= R
µΘ − ρ
1− ρ
K
was expected, whereas actually the outcome is volatile with variance(
µΘ − ρ
1− ρ
RK
)2
σ2(nΘ).
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nΘ
β 1−ρ
(µΘ−ρ)RK
n¯
For dR
dn
> 0
σ2(nΘ)
Figure 1: Granularity bound n¯[µΘ
−
, r
+
, R
−
, K
−
].
Substituting Y p[K1] for V and the variance for ∆, criterion (15) takes the
form:
σ2(nΘ) ≤ β
1− ρ
µΘ − ρ
1
RK
. (16)
By assumption, the left hand side of the inequality is zero for nΘ ≤ n0 and
then increases in nΘ. The right-hand side declines in µ from infinity (for
µΘ → ρ) towards
β
RK
for µ = 1. In addition, for µ < 1, it rises in ρ and
declines in R. Thus, if R rises with nΘ due to specialization advantages, the
right-hand side of inequality (16) declines with nΘ; otherwise it is indepen-
dent of nΘ.
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Figure 1 shows, for a given µ, the two sides of (16) as functions of nΘ.
Intersection point n¯ defines the bound for the level of granularity which is in
line with tolerance β. Signs below variables denote the sign of the respective
partial derivative. The main message is that there is a trade-off between
coverage and granularity. Other things equal, a fine grid is only appropriate
if a small set of states is covered by targeted actions. If a large set of states
is to be covered then the grid should be coarse. We may call this the bird’s
eye view, as opposed to the zoom lens. Moreover, more cautious granularity
should be chosen if R or K are high, that is, if a high volume of income
is generated from risky investment. Strategic choices and policy decisions
are examples for action, where high levels of resources are at stake and a
large range of potential events has to be accounted for. The above result
recommends to guide strategic rationality by a bird’s eye like frame rather
than planning with a rich set of instruments based on finely distinguished
contingencies. Unlike in a limited attention model, the recommendation does
not follow from bounded information-processing capacity – they could be
overcome by employing expert systems or intelligent machines. The reason
is that the unreliability of instruments counts more heavy if large sums are
at stake.
Finally, granularity and coverage may not be independent but jointly result
from some explorative effort γ so that nΘ(γ) and µΘ(γ) are both rising with
γ. Then the right-hand side (RHS) of (16) is a declining function of γ;
and the left-hand side (LHS) is rising in γ as soon as n(γ) has reached n0
at some γ0. Figure 2 shows the two sides as functions of γ. Moreover, it
makes explicit that LHS expresses the unreliability of risk assessment for a
given state of experience (SE) from past realizations of events. If the state of
experience improves, LHS is shifted outward. Intersection point γ¯ marks the
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γLHS(γ|SE)
γ0
RHS(γ|r
+
, K
−
; β
+
)
γ¯
Figure 2: Innovation bound γ¯[r
+
, K
−
|β
+
, SE
+
].
bound up to which explorative efforts should be exerted to raise granularity
and coverage of the state space used for designing financial products and
investing in risky projects. If a large stock of capital is at stake, a more
cautious bound should be chosen. If there is a generous safe opportunity for
well-performing robust investment (high r), then the bound can be slackened.
At last, the exploration frontier γ¯ should be kept in line with the state of
experience.
Since the 1990ties the set of contingent financial products offered in the fi-
nancial market has been hugely expanded. The financial crisis revealed that
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the expansion was based on shaky foundation. The presented analysis sug-
gests to limit financial product innovations so that the demand of knowledge
about their risks is matched by the accumulated experience, which from a
system’s point of view is experience with the consequences of a given set of
financial products for the real performance of the economy. Based on this
argument, Falkinger (2014) proposes a rule for sound financial development,
according to which the growth of financial products should be tied down to
the long-run growth rate – analogous to monetary policy rules.
5 The dialogue between experts and decision
makers in an uncertain world
Decision making is typically seen as an agent’s choice how to allocate a
resource or capability on different instruments for pursuing a goal. The role
of an expert is then to check which choices are feasible, to calculate their
consequences and to identify the best choice. Essentially, this boils down to
an optimization-problem. As an input for solving this problem, the expert
needs from the decision maker information on the volume of effort or resource
he or she is able or willing to spend, and on the goal or valuation system by
which the decision maker values outcomes. Under uncertainty, outcomes are
state contingent and the expert needs in addition information on the agent’s
attitude towards risk or their capacity to bear risk. For instance, a firm that
wants to take out a loan is checked with respect to its ability to bear risk.
And a client who comes to the bank with his or her savings is asked about
the size of wealth to be managed and the risk preference.
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Solving optimization problems is not the only function of experts. Another
important role is to extend the set of feasible instruments by innovation.
In this role, the message of decision makers to experts is: Search for more
productive instruments. Raising productivity is closely related to specializa-
tion and differentiation. In particular, in a model of uncertainty one wishes
to have a richer set of instruments to be prepared for different events. For
instance, in an incomplete market model innovation means to cover so far
uncovered situations by new state-contingent securities.
Expert systems use expert languages, whereas decision makers typically face
a problem in a different language. A third and very crucial function of
experts is therefore the translation of real world problems into the disciplined
language they use for supporting decision makers with their expertise, as
well as the inverse translation of their results into the language of the users.
Essentially, this means an expert system is also responsible for appropriate
modeling and communication. Appropriate modeling requires to check that
primitives and assumptions on the primitives of the expert frame, capture
in a reliable, though abstract way the essential features of the problem a
decision maker faces.
A problem inherent to economic modeling is that there is typically no unique
model for a given real world situation. As witnessed by Debreu (1991, p. 3),
“a Grand Unified Theory will remain out of the reach of economics, which
will keep appealing to a large collection of individual theories.” This brings
us to the fourth task of expert systems: The choice or design of the models.
In this respect, a problem to solve is the tension between sophistication and
reliability. On the one side, a higher degree of sophistication allows more fine-
tuned preparation for specific realizations of possible future conditions. More
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specialized instruments can be developed and resources can be allocated in a
more diversified way. On the other side, a finely structured frame demands
more information so that, for a given basis of experience, a more sophisticated
frame may be less reliable. In this respect we can think of a model as a
problem solver which requires a certain input from the user – the model’s
demand of knowledge from the user who wishes to be supported by the
model. Thus, for choosing an appropriate model, models have to be ordered
according to their knowledge requirements.
Under uncertainty, the tension between sophistication and reliability is par-
ticularly pronounced. Keynes, for instance, argued that it is better to account
for true uncertainty by conditioning a model on an exogenous state of ex-
pectations or confidence rather than endogenizing expectations in a calculus
of probabilities which in fact are unknown. The approach sketched in this
paper stresses that probability spaces are not given by nature. The crucial
aspect for choosing an appropriate space is the grid of distinguished events.
On the one side, distinction of events is crucial for targeted instruments and
contingent action. On the other side, unreliable distinction leads to decep-
tions. Granularity and coverage of the used probability space are important
determinants of both the advantages of diversification and their potential
deceptions. Therefore, the task required from the experts is to present the
stochastic models offered to the decision makers in an order of granularity
and coverage. The decision makers’ task is then to choose the granularity
and coverage which keep deceptions within tolerable bounds. For instance,
at the level of strategic decisions, large coverage and coarse granularity are
better guides than fine but unreliable granularity or a narrow focus.
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6 Concluding remarks
Rational choice under uncertainty considers optimal decision making in a
given framework, in particular, conditional on a given state space. From a
more fundamental perspective, however, rationality implies to be aware of
limitations of knowledge. Moreover, it requires to account for the fact that
reasoning is conditional on the cognitive frame in which we analyze things.
In dealing with an uncertain future, the critical element is: Which events
can we distinguish so that actions can be properly targeted to the events?
Therefore, separating distinguishable states from undistinguishable ones is
important for reasonable dealing with uncertainty. In other words, the state
space, on which decision making under uncertainty is conditioned from a
conventional economic point of view, is endogenous and a matter of choice
itself. The characteristics to be chosen are the granularity of the grid in
which we distinguish and measure events and the weight we assign to the
area that is covered by the grid relative to the uncovered unknown terrain.
Refined granularity and large coverage generate differentiation advantages.
Yet, for a given base of experience, more coarse granularity and moderate
coverage lead to more reliable actions. To allow decision makers to keep
actions in line with a tolerable level of deceptions or crises, experts need to
order their models according to the required knowledge about future events
and the performance of actions contingent on these events.
Reasonable dealing under uncertainty is therefore akin to strategic rational-
ity. Choosing a strategy is not the same as acting according to a detailed
optimal plan. Rather it means to focus on goals and to set priorities on
broader scales; having thereby in mind that the strategic decision should be
sustainable over a longer horizon, even though it may not be optimal under
29
all specific conditions in the short run. It was said that appropriate reduction
of complexity is an important component of good management. This is in
contrast to the view that complexity is a fate to which we must react opti-
mally by sophisticated actions. While the latter view is adequate in a given
situation, it is less obvious for the framing of uncertain exogenous events.
And in shaping the future, complexity is definitely an endogenous outcome.
In this respect one might wonder if quantitative dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium models are an appropriate guide for policy making.
At some level of abstraction one could argue that the request, to bring the
complexity of a model in line with our knowledge about the events the model
distinguishes, has also the flavor of rational choosing our focus of attention.
In the end, the bottom line is this: Rational dealing with limited knowledge is
not an individual choice problem. In terms of the introductory example: The
financial crisis was not caused by the fact that the one or the other individual
made errors in risk assessment or had a wrong focus of attention; rather it
was the consequence of coordination of agents by unreliable models of risks.
So if rational inattention is an appeal to the scientific community to focus
attention and effort on reliable modeling, rather than advice to individual
agents to be clever, then I am happy to join.
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